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Abstract 
The ubiquity of web applications has led to an 
increased focus on the development of attacks 
targeting these applications. One particular type of 
attack that has recently become prominent is the SQL 
injection attack. SQL injection attacks can potentially 
result in unauthorized access to confidential 
information stored in a backend database. In this 
paper we describe an anomaly based approach which 
utilizes the character distribution of certain sections of 
HTTP requests to detect previously unseen SQL 
injection attacks. Our approach requires no user 
interaction, and no modification of, or access to, either 
the backend database or the source code of the web 
application itself. Our practical results suggest that the 
model proposed in this paper is superior to existing 
models at detecting SQL injection attacks. We also 
evaluate the effectiveness of our model at detecting 
different types of SQL injection attacks. 
1. Introduction 
Web servers that provide services to customers are 
typically connected to a backend database that 
potentially contains sensitive information. With the 
increased deployment of such web applications there 
has been an increase in the number of attacks targeting 
such applications. Gartner states that 75% of cyber 
attacks occur at the application layer and, of the sites 
that they audited, 97% were vulnerable to web attacks 
[1]. One class of attacks targeted by web applications 
that is particularly dangerous is SQL injection [2]. 
SQL injection vulnerabilities occur because of 
nonexistent and/or incomplete validation of user input 
[3]. As a result an attacker can inject input that will 
potentially alter the behavior of the script being 
executed. This could result in the attacker gaining 
access to the backend database and potentially 
sensitive information.  
One of the most promising solutions proposed for 
detecting SQL injection attacks is the use of an 
anomaly based intrusion detection system (IDS). 
Typically, anomaly based IDSs utilize a combination 
of different heuristics and models in order to detect a 
variety of different attack types, such as worms, buffer 
overflows, application DoS, attacks due to 
vulnerabilities in the HTTP protocol, SQL injection 
attacks, and so on. Recently, the practice of combining 
several models has been applied specifically to the 
detection of SQL injection attacks [4-7]. 
However, a persistent problem in anomaly based 
approaches is that they tend to suffer from a high rate 
of false alerts in real environments [8, 9]. Additionally, 
such approaches require manual user interaction to 
fine-tune thresholds, or require access to the source 
code of the application [10].  
A limitation of anomaly based approaches which 
combine a number of different models for detecting a 
variety of attacks is that when an attack is detected, 
very little information about the attack is available to 
the administrator. This is because there is a lack of 
information on the effectiveness of each individual 
model in the detection of attacks. This exacerbates the 
problem of differentiating false positive alerts from 
real attacks.  Why is this significant? In our earlier 
work [11] we discovered that four variations of a 
length model had different requirements in terms of the 
completeness of the training dataset, differed in 
performance and the types of attacks that each model 
detected.  In other words, variations of the length 
model produced had different requirements and 
produced different results, both in their detection and 
false positive rates.  Therefore obtaining information 
such as the above for each individual model is crucial 
for an administrator in making the correct decision 
when they consider which models to implement.  
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 One possible way of addressing this is to first gain 
a better understanding of which particular anomaly 
models are the most appropriate for detecting specific 
types of attack.  We envisage the development of a 
matrix which characterizes the extent to which 
different anomaly based models can contribute towards 
the detection of the complete set of attack classes. This 
will indicate the combination of models best suited for 
the detection of the greatest number of attacks possible 
i.e. increase detection rates, and do so while reducing 
the number of false positives.  
In this work we apply two different character 
distribution models to the detection of the two most 
common classes of SQL injection attacks, namely the 
UNION and Tautology classes (discussed in detail in 
Section 2).  We evaluate the ability of the proposed 
models to detect exploits, and obfuscated variations of 
the exploits, using two popular open source web 
applications; phpBB and phpNuke, with both synthetic 
and production datasets. 
The main contributions of this paper are twofold: 
(1) a new character distribution model which is 
superior at detecting SQL injection attacks; and 
(2) an evaluation of the suitability of character based 
models for detecting different classes of SQL 
injection attacks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
In Section 2 we describe the two common classes of 
SQL injection attacks that this paper focuses on. In 
Section 3 we discuss the related work. In Section 4 we 
discuss our proposed approach and in Section 5 we 
explain the datasets and library of attacks used. In 
Section 6 we provide the results and discussion and, 
finally, in Section 7 we provide conclusions and 
identify future work. 
2. SQL injection attacks 
For the sake of brevity we do not provide a detailed 
description of SQL injection attacks in this paper (the 
reader is referred to [12-14] for detailed examples).  In 
this work we are particularly interested in two major 
classes of SQL injection attack, as identified by 
Halfond, Viegas and Orso [15] in their classification 
scheme, namely the UNION and Tautology attacks.  
We test and evaluate the effectiveness of the two 
models implemented in this paper against these two 
classes (which we believe represent the vast majority 
of SQL injection attacks).  Obfuscated variations of 
these attacks are also created.  
The UNION statement in SQL allows multiple 
SELECT statements to be appended together.  UNION 
attacks usually work by appending an additional 
SELECT statement to the original one.  HTTP requests 
containing such attacks are typically longer and have a 
more anomalous character distribution than other 
classes of SQL injection attacks.  
Tautology attacks, on the other hand, allow the 
attacker to manipulate the WHERE clause in an SQL 
SELECT statement so that it always evaluates to true 
(thereby over-riding the restrictions of the WHERE 
clause entirely). Tautology attacks are typically short 
and are not necessarily anomalous in their character 
distribution. As a result they tend to be more difficult 
to detect than UNION attacks. 
3. Related work 
In this section of the paper we give an overview of 
anomaly-based approaches that have been applied to 
the detection of web based attacks in general, one of 
which focuses specifically on the detection of SQL 
injection attacks.  We also focus on works that have 
made use of character distribution based models, at 
least in part. 
Kruegel and Vigna [5], proposed an anomaly based 
approach which utilized six different models to detect 
web attacks in HTTP requests that contain a query 
section. One of the six models was a character 
distribution model, which this paper builds on.  The 
model utilized the chi-square test applied to character 
frequencies arranged in six groups.  The authors of that 
work make the observation that the character 
distribution model did not prove to be very useful in 
the detection of input validation attacks (which is the 
category of attacks that SQL injection falls under).  We 
believe this limitation of their character distribution 
model arises due to the coarse groupings formed by 
their model (this observation is echoed by Wang and 
Stolfo [6]).  In this paper, we utilize a more fine-
grained model which is capable of accurately detecting 
SQL injection attacks, as we demonstrate. 
Another approach, payload based anomaly detector 
(PAYL) extends the work in [5] by utilizing a different 
statistical model, a full byte distribution and the use of 
clustering [6] which they utilize to detect worms.  
Though they state that their approach could detect 
other types of attacks, it was designed specifically to 
detect worms. They tested their approach with other 
web attacks using the 1999 DARPA dataset. They also 
used datasets from their university web server to detect 
Code Red and a buffer overflow attack. In terms of 
their character distribution these two attacks are vastly 
different to normal requests.  In this paper we focus on 
the detection of more subtle attacks. 
A criticism of the PAYL technique is that they 
were evaluated, at least in part, using the 1999 DARPA 
dataset. It has been observed that the dataset does not 
contain a significant variety of traffic and it is not 
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 representative of the type of traffic a web server would 
receive today [16]. Also, the 1999 DARPA dataset 
contains only four web attacks (none of which were 
SQL injection attacks). As pointed out by Wang et al, 
these attacks are either extremely long with a limited 
number of characters repeated many times or have a 
very anomalous query string [6].   
Another anomaly based approach, proposed by 
Valeur, Mutz and Vigna [7], utilizes the models 
proposed by Kruegel and Vigna, however in this case 
the models are applied directly to the SQL queries 
rather than the HTTP requests.  This approach has been 
applied specifically for the detection of SQL injection 
attacks.  In this approach a profile is built, based on the 
SQL queries, for each individual file (or script) 
associated with the web application. The authors show 
that the approach is effective at detecting attacks. 
However, the authors also state that many installations 
of the proposed approach would require the 
introduction of custom data types to produce 
acceptably low false positive alert rates.  That is, user 
intervention would be required. For example, adding a 
new month value that did not exist in their training 
stage resulted in false positives. The approach requires 
changes to the libmysql client library in order to extract 
SQL queries that are used to build the profiles. Also 
their approach requires the training dataset to contain 
all possible SQL queries. In practice this dataset would 
be difficult to generate [17].  
We now describe the character distribution model 
utilized by Kruegel and Vigna (2003) in greater detail 
as we build upon their approach in order to apply a 
new type of character distribution model specifically to 
the detection of SQL injection attacks, based upon the 
content of HTTP payloads. 
3.1. Kruegel and Vigna approach 
Kruegel and Vigna utilized six different models to 
detect web attacks in HTTP requests that contain a 
query section. As discussed in the introduction to this 
paper, here we focus only on character distribution 
based models (as one of our motives is to better 
understand how well character distribution based 
models can perform in isolation) and therefore, in this 
section we only describe that aspect of the work by 
Kruegel and Vigna.  As a result, it is not meaningful to 
directly compare the results of our approach with those 
obtained by Kruegel and Vigna. Our adaptation and 
implementation of the character distribution model 
proposed by Kruegel and Vigna is discussed next. The 
general approach utilized by Kruegel and Vigna (and 
adopted in this paper) is to extract the query section 
(see below) of an HTTP request (whether it be a GET 
or POST request) and to apply the chosen model to it.  
A training phase is used to determine thresholds which 
are applied during the testing phase to identify 
anomalous requests. 
We utilize an HTTP parser to extract the query 
section (which often corresponds to user input) of an 
HTTP request.  For a GET request the query section 
occurs in the URL after the '?' character; and for a 
POST request the query is contained in the message 
body.  We now describe in detail the testing and 
training phases proposed and implemented by Kruegel 
and Vigna for their character distribution model (which 
we will refer to as the frequency character distribution 
(FCD) model from now on). 
3.1.1. FCD model: training phase.  The training 
phase for the FCD model occurs as follows.  For each 
HTTP request compute the relative frequency of each 
character in the query section of the request; sort the 
characters in order of decreasing frequency; form six 
character groupings as described below; and add the 
sum of the relative frequencies for each group to the 
cumulative total for each group.  Once all requests 
have been processed the cumulative total for each 
group is divided by the number of requests, in order to 
obtain the average value for each group.  These 
average values are referred to as the expected values 
which are used during the application of the chi-square 
test in the testing phase. 
The sorted relative frequencies obtained above are 
placed into 6 groups based on the frequency of the 
characters seen in the query section in descending 
order. The first group contains the frequency of the 
most frequent character; the second and third groups 
contain the sum of the next three most frequent 
characters; the fourth group contains the sum of the 
next five; the fifth group contains the sum of the next 
four; and the final group is the sum of the frequencies 
of remaining characters. 
3.1.2. FCD model: testing phase.  In the testing phase 
of the FCD model, a modified version of the chi-square 
statistical test is used to identify anomalous requests. 
The chi-square test computes the probability (or 
confidence level) that the character distribution values 
seen during testing are representative of the expected 
values computed during the training phase. The steps 
in applying the chi-square test to an HTTP request 
during the testing phase are as follows: 
1. Calculate the observed values, i.e., the sorted, 
grouped character distribution of the query 
component of the request.  Adjust the expected 
values computed during training by multiplying 
them by the length of this request.   
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 2. Calculate the chi-square value using Equation 1, 
where Oi and Ei represent the observed and 
expected values, respectively. 
(Oi − Ei)2
Eii= 0
6
 
          (1) 
3. Based on the value of χ2 and the number of 
degrees of freedom (in this case one less than the 
number of groups, i.e., 5) we compute the 
significance level (probability) using well-known 
lookup tables.  The anomaly score is simply one 
minus this probability. Note that we use the term 
anomaly score to describe the degree to which a 
request is abnormal.  
If the anomaly score is above a particular threshold 
an alert is triggered. The manner in which the threshold 
is determined is described next. 
3.1.3. FCD model: threshold determination.  To 
determine the threshold, the FCD model applies the 
testing procedure described above (step 2) to the 
training data set.  Recall that Kruegel and Vigna 
proposed six models and the threshold for all the six 
models was set to be the highest anomaly score seen 
during training plus 10% of that value.  
3.1.4. Discussion of the FCD model.  The rationale 
for designing the FCD model as described above has to 
be put into a historical context. When the FCD model 
was proposed most of the attacks targeted at web 
servers were attacks such as worms and buffer 
overflows. As discussed above, such attacks are very 
different than normal HTTP requests. Typically, such 
attacks have a number of characters that are repeated 
many times and the range of character distributions are 
highly anomalous. For example, the Code Red attack 
detected in both [5, 6] is an extremely long and 
anomalous query string, of the total of 259 characters 
in Code Red; 224 characters are the letter “N”.  
Kruegel and Vigna made the same observations. As 
a result, the FCD model only compares the frequency 
of characters in each grouping without considering the 
characters in each group. However, since then attacks 
at the application layer have become more 
sophisticated, e.g. SQL injection attacks. As a result 
using the FCD model to detect these subtle and hard to 
detect attacks is not effective.  
In the following sections we will describe how our 
proposed approach builds on the FCD model to detect 
these subtle and hard to detect attacks, specifically 
SQL injection attacks.  
4. Proposed approach 
In this section we will describe our model in detail. 
From now on we refer to our model as the same 
character comparison (SCC) model. The motivation 
for the SCC model is to overcome the limitations of the 
FCD model identified above in order to detect more 
subtle attacks. In particular, the SCC model does not 
sort the frequencies of characters. As a consequence, 
the manner in which the threshold is determined is also 
different.  
The SCC model (like the FCD model) intercepts 
HTTP requests and extracts the query section from the 
request. The training phase is used to determine 
thresholds which are applied during the testing phase 
to identify anomalous requests. We now describe in 
detail the testing and training phases used by the SCC 
model.  
4.1. SCC model: training phase 
In the training phase, for each HTTP request, the 
SCC model views the extracted query section and 
calculates the frequency of each character in the query. 
For example, given the extracted query section 
‘id=444’, the frequency count for the characters would 
be 3 for the character ‘4’, and the frequency count 
would be 1 for the characters ‘i’, ‘d’, ‘=’, and zero for 
all other characters. Once all the requests in the 
training dataset have been processed, the cumulative 
character count is calculated.  Unlike the FCD model, 
the SCC model does not sort characters in descending 
order and then place them into six predefined groups.  
However, due to the requirements of the chi-square 
test, we group the expected values so that each group 
has a frequency greater than or equal to five (this 
process is known as Yates' correction – see [18, 19]).  
These groupings represent the expected values (Ei) 
utilized in the chi-square test during the testing phase.  
Note that the number of groupings obtained will vary 
depending upon the training data. 
4.2. SCC model: testing phase 
Like the FCD model, the SCC model also the uses 
the chi-square statistical test to identify anomalous 
requests.  Similar to the approach utilized above for the 
FCD model, the steps in applying the chi-square test to 
an HTTP request in the testing phase for the SCC 
model are as follows: 
1. Calculate the observed values (Oi) of the query 
component of the HTTP request as follows: first 
determine the frequency of each character in the 
query portion of the request; and then group these 
frequencies in exactly the same manner as the 
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 groupings were formed when determining the 
expected values (at the end of the training phase).   
2. Calculate the chi-square value using Equation 1.  
3. Based on the value of χ2 and the number of 
degrees of freedom (in this case one less than the 
number of groups) we compute the significance 
level (probability) using well-known lookup 
tables.  In this case the anomaly score is equal to 
this probability.  
If the anomaly score is above a particular threshold 
an alert is triggered. The manner in which the threshold 
is determined is described next. 
4.3. SCC model: threshold determination 
In this case we chose the threshold as the anomaly 
score that produced zero false alerts when used on the 
training dataset (rather than adding 10% to this value 
as Kruegel and Vigna did). The reason for doing this is 
based on the assumption that the training dataset is 
roughly representative of the type of traffic we will 
encounter in the testing dataset. This technique allows 
us to determine the best threshold value specific to 
each file (or script). Also, the process can be applied to 
all the existing files in an automated fashion. Our 
experiments demonstrate that determining the 
threshold in this manner is effective, while choosing 
the threshold as done in the FCD model can lead to 
false negatives under certain circumstances which we 
will discuss in detail in Section 6. 
5. Library of attacks and datasets  
All of our experiments were performed using two 
well-known open source applications written in PHP; 
the first is the phpBB (bulletin board) application and 
the second the phpNuke (content management system) 
application. These two applications suffer from a 
number of SQL injection vulnerabilities. Versions 
2.0.0 and 2.5.0 of phpBB and phpNuke versions 6.0, 
7.3 and 7.5, running on an Apache v1.3.34 web server 
using PHP v4.4.2 and MySQL v4.1.11 were utilized.   
The attacks relating to the phpBB application are 
described in the SecurityFocus advisories with Bugtraq 
IDs: 9942, 9896, and 7979. The phpNuke attacks are 
described in the advisories with Bugtraq IDs 10741, 
15421, 10749, and 9544.  Finally, two SQL injection 
attacks discovered and presented in [7] were also 
utilized.  
A common technique utilized by attackers to evade 
detection and prevention techniques, known as 
alternate encoding, involves encoding HTTP requests 
in non-standard ways (for example utilizing 
hexadecimal characters) so that, for example, well-
known attack strings are obfuscated [3, 13]. We 
created obfuscated variations of all the attacks for both 
the phpBB and phpNuke applications used in this 
paper in order to evaluate the effectiveness of character 
distribution models for detecting them.  
To generate the attacks we utilized scripts 
containing all of the attacks (and their obfuscated 
variants) which were incorporated into the format of an 
HTTP request and sent to the web server. The HTTP 
requests and their responses were captured using 
WireShark. We examined the responses to ensure that 
the attacks were indeed successful. The attacks were 
captured in tcpdump file format and were then merged 
into the testing datasets. 
5.1. Datasets 
As shown in Table 1, for the phpBB application a 
total of four datasets were used. Initially we did not 
have access to log files for the phpBB application 
therefore we also created the two synthetic datasets.  
The two synthetic datasets were for the smilies and 
words files (these are two of the PHP scripts associated 
with the phpBB application). For each file the most 
popular functionalities were identified and requests for 
these functions were generated and captured using 
WireShark. The proportion of the training and testing 
data used for the smilies and words datasets was 50%-
50%. The remaining two datasets utilized for the 
phpBB application relate to the viewtopic file and were 
obtained from our university production server. The 
first dataset from the production server (VT05) is for 
all requests to the viewtopic file for the entire 12 
months of 2005 (56184 requests). The second dataset 
(VT06) is for all requests to the viewtopic file for the 
first nine months of 2006 (242484 requests). For both 
of the viewtopic datasets the traffic from the month of 
January was used in the training phase.  While we 
defer a rigorous analysis of the impact of the amount of 
training data utilized to future work, as we show 
below, the amounts of training data selected were 
sufficient for demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
SCC model. 
 
Table 1.  Dataset information 
Requests Attacks 
Datasets Train Test U T Total 
Smilies 21496 21496 8 2 10 
Words 1360 1360 7 2 9 
VT05 28598 533248 32 0 32 
VT06 43719 198765 32 0 32 
Search 2466 1565 27 0 27 
Youracount 5788 10698 0 11 22 
Weblinks 12 NA 13 0 13 
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 News 49495 73662 0 0 0 
Submitnews 453 678 0 0 0 
Surveys 560 642 0 0 0 
Forums 519 619 0 0 0 
Statistics 3229 678 0 0 0 
TOTAL 119 15 134 
 
For the phpNuke application all the datasets were 
obtained from a production server at our university 
which runs the phpNuke application. The dataset 
consists of ten weeks of traffic from March to mid May 
2007. The first four weeks were used for training and 
the remaining six weeks were used for the testing 
datasets. Note that upon detailed examination of the 
phpNuke application we found that all requests go 
through one file called modules.php. This file parses 
the query and based on the value passed to the attribute 
called “name”, the request is sent to another file which 
in turn processes the request. As both the FCD and 
SCC models are file based, using scripts we parsed all 
the requests in the training dataset for the phpNuke 
application using the “name” attribute for unique 
values. These requests were then put into separate files 
and as a result we ended up with 19 new training files 
based on the requests in the original training dataset.  
Before the parsing process could begin we took 
measures to ensure that the datasets were as clean as 
possible. While we acknowledge that we cannot 
guarantee that the training datasets are completely 
attack free, we note that this is a common problem with 
real datasets where one cannot guarantee that no 
attacks exist. The "suspicious" requests were identified 
and extracted into a separate file which we tested 
separately during our experiments (see Section 6). 
6. Results and discussion 
This section provides the results for both the FCD 
and SCC models applied to the phpBB and phpNuke 
applications.  The FCD model was implemented to 
allow for comparison with the SCC model and to 
evaluate the relative effectiveness of each using the 
same datasets and attacks. 
6.1. phpBB results 
Table 2 shows the detection and false positive 
results for UNION and Tautology attacks (and the 
obfuscated variations) for both the FCD and SCC 
models when used on the phpBB application.  
Beginning with UNION attacks, the FCD model 
produced 0 false positives for all four datasets in the 
phpBB application (smilies, words, VT05 and VT06). 
However, the detection rate for UNION attacks using 
the FCD was 0/79 (when using threshold as above).  
 
Table 2. phpBB results for FCD & SCC models 
UNION Tautology 
Datasets Det. FP Det. FP 
Smilies 0/8 0 1/2 0 
Words 0/7 0 1/2 0 
VT05 0/32 0 NA NA 
VT06 0/32 0 NA NA 
Total (FCD) 0/79 0 2/4 0 
Smilies 3/8 0 1/2 0 
Words 7/7 0 1/2 0 
VT05 32/32 215 NA NA 
VT06 32/32 168 NA NA 
Total (SCC) 74/79 383 2/4 0 
 
The SCC model, when used to detect UNION 
attacks achieved a 100% detection rate for all the 
datasets except the smilies dataset, in which 37.5% 
(3/8) of the attacks were detected. For the smilies and 
words datasets these detection rates were achieved with 
0 false alerts occurring. For the VT05 dataset 215 false 
alerts were produced, which is a false alert rate of 
0.03%. For the VT06 dataset 168 false alerts were 
produced, which is a false alert rate of 0.02%.  Note 
that for the VT05 dataset, 7 of the 11 months generated 
two or zero false alerts. For the VT06 dataset, all 
months (except one) produced 15 or less false alerts.  
In terms of detecting Tautology attacks, as shown 
in Table 2, both the FCD and SCC models achieved a 
detection rate of 50% for the smilies and words 
datasets. This detection rate was achieved at zero false 
alerts for both models. Recall that neither of the 
viewtopic datasets contained Tautology attacks. We 
note that these results were achieved using the 
threshold determination process specific to each model.  
We also tested the FCD and SCC models to 
determine the false positive rate when the threshold is 
chosen to be the minimum value that results in a 
detection rate of 100%.  This allows comparison of the 
models in a way which is independent of the strategy 
used to choose threshold values. Table 3 shows the 
false positive rates for each dataset and model when 
100% detection is achieved for the phpBB application.  
Note, for space reasons we only show the results for 
the month of September in 2005 (from the VT05 
dataset) which at 148,672 requests, has the largest 
number of requests in a single month.  
The results show that the SCC model generates 
significantly lower false positive rates when the 
detection rate is 100% for the datasets in the phpBB 
application.  In practice an administrator would choose 
a threshold which produces the detection and false 
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 positive rate combination that meets their 
requirements. 
 
Table 3. False alerts (phpBB - 100% detect) 
FCD Model SCC Model 
Datasets FP FP% FP FP% 
Smilies 12852 59.7% 199 0.9% 
Words 941 68.7% 80 5.84% 
VT05{Sep} 5637 3.79% 4 0.002% 
6.2. phpNuke results 
We had 19 datasets for the phpNuke application, 
however only 3 of the datasets contained attacks 
(namely the search, weblinks and youraccount 
datasets). However, to further evaluate false positive 
rates produced by models we also tested the other 
datasets. For space reasons we provide only the top 5 
datasets (in terms of volume).  
Starting with the UNION attacks, as shown in 
Table 4, the FCD model detected only 25% (10/40) of 
all UNION attacks with zero false alerts. As for the 
datasets with no attacks, the FCD model generated a 
false positive rate of 0.09% (72) for the news dataset. 
The SCC model achieved 100% detection rate for all 
the UNION attacks in the phpNuke application. This 
detection rate was accomplished with a total false alert 
rate of 0.5% (a total of 4 alerts; l alert in the search 
dataset; and 3 alerts in the forums dataset).  
In terms of detecting Tautology attacks, as shown 
in Table 4, using the FCD model there were no false 
alerts, but none of the Tautology attacks were detected. 
Note there was no weblink files in the testing dataset, 
so determining false alerts was not possible, but all 
attacks 13/13 were detected.  The SCC model detected 
54% of the Tautology attacks (6/11) at a false alert rate 
of 0.  We note that these results were achieved using 
the threshold determination process specific to each 
model.  
 
Table 4. phpNuke results: FCD & SCC models 
UNION Tautology 
Datasets(FCD) Det. FP Det. FP 
search 0/27 0 NA NA 
weblinks 10/13 NA1 NA NA 
youraccount NA 0 0/11 0 
news NA 72 NA 0 
statistics NA 0 NA 0 
submitnews NA 0 NA 0 
Forums NA 0 NA 0 
surveys NA 0 NA 0 
Total (FCD)  10/40 72 0/11 0 
                                                        
1 There was no weblink files in the testing dataset, so determining 
false alerts was not possible, but all attacks 13/13 were detected. 
Datasets (SCC) Det FP Det FP 
Search 27/27 1 NA NA 
Weblinks 13/13 NA NA NA 
Youraccount NA 0 6/11 0 
News NA 0 NA 0 
Statistics NA 0 NA 0 
Submitnews NA 0 NA 0 
Forums NA 3 NA 0 
Surveys NA 0 NA 0 
Total (SCC) 40/40 4 6/11 0 
 
Similar to the phpBB application, in the phpNuke 
application we also changed the threshold in each 
model so that all attacks were detected, using both 
models. Again this was done to determine the false 
alert rates for each model when 100% detection is 
reached.  The results demonstrate that that the SCC 
model generates significantly lower false positives 
when the detection rate is 100% for the datasets in the 
phpNuke application. For example, originally the SCC 
model detected only 6/11 of the Tautology attacks in 
the youraccount dataset (with no false alerts).  
However, when the threshold is increased so that all 11 
attacks are detected the rate of false alerts remains 
relatively low (0.69%).  On the other hand, the false 
alert rate increases dramatically for the FCD model (to 
61.7%) when the threshold is increased to the point 
that allows all attacks to be detected. 
 
Table 5. False alerts (phpNuke - 100% detect) 
FCD Model SCC Model 
Datasets FP FP% FP FP% 
YourAccount 6610 61.7% 74 0.69% 
Search 432 27.1% 1 0.06% 
6.3. Detection of genuine suspicious requests 
As shown in Table 6, the FCD model detected 2% 
of suspicious requests. While the SCC model detected 
99.7% of all suspicious requests. Note that some of 
these suspicious requests were indeed attacks. 
 
Table 6.  Detection of suspicious requests 
Datasets (FCD) Detected (%) Missed 
VT05 185/2920 6.73% 2735 
VT06 7/6412 0.10% 6405 
Search 0/4 0% 4 
Weblinks 0/2 0% 2 
News 0/35 0% 35 
Surveys 0/1 0% 1 
Total (FCD) 192/9374 2% 9182 
Datasets (SCC) Detected (%) Missed 
VT05 2920/2920 100% 0 
VT06 6412/6412 100% 0 
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 Search 4/4 100% 0 
Weblinks 2/2 100% 0 
News 9/35 25.7% 26 
Surveys 1/1 100% 0 
Total (SCC) 9348/9374 99.7% 26 
6.4. Discussion 
The reason for the low detection rates for the FCD 
model, as echoed by Wang et al, is that the FCD model 
is too coarse. This has led to its inability to detect more 
subtle attacks such as SQL injection attacks. A 
consequence of this is that the manner in which the 
threshold is determined in the FCD model is too coarse 
as well. Recall that the FCD model calculates the 
threshold based on the highest anomaly seen in training 
plus 10% of that value.  However, as we have shown, 
when we adjust the threshold to allow higher detection 
rates, the false alert rate becomes unacceptably high 
(up to 68.7% in our experiments). 
Through our experimentation we have observed 
that some datasets (e.g. smilies and words) have a 
small number of normal requests that are vastly 
different from other requests in the dataset and as a 
result have a higher anomaly score. In these cases, 
choosing the threshold based on the highest anomaly 
score creates a threshold that is very high and can lead 
to attacks not being detected. We found that this was 
the case in some of the datasets (e.g. smilies and words 
dataset).  This demonstrates a limitation of the models 
that we have tested, namely that choosing thresholds 
based on the highest anomaly score within the training 
dataset can lead to attacks not being detected. 
The results show that the SCC model is extremely 
effective in the detection of UNION attacks. The SCC 
model detected most or all UNION attacks across all 
datasets (and both applications) examined with zero or 
low false positive rates.  Additionally, the approach 
proposed in this paper for determining thresholds has 
proven to be very effective at achieving high detection 
rates and low false positive rates.  
While the results relating to the detection of 
Tautology attacks were not as good as those for the 
UNION attacks, we demonstrated that the SCC model 
is able to detect Tautology attacks with relatively low 
false positive rates. 
Finally, to test the performance of the SCC model 
for the testing/detection phase we processed the largest 
testing dataset file (in tcpdump format) in each 
application. The largest files were 148,672 requests 
(48,6786 packets) for phpBB, and 73,662 requests 
(154,234 packets) for the phpNuke application. The 
average overhead was 1.18 milliseconds for phpBB 
and 0.6 milliseconds for the phpNuke application. The 
performance of the SCC model is quite good, 
especially considering the prototype was written in 
Java, with no code optimization, and run on a Pentium 
III with 512MB of RAM. 
7. Conclusions and future work 
In this paper we evaluated two character 
distribution models; the FCD and SCC models. We 
have shown that the SCC model is very effective at 
detecting SQL injection attacks in general, as well as 
being more accurate than the FCD model overall.  We 
have also evaluated the models' effectiveness at 
detecting the UNION and Tautology classes of SQL 
injection attacks.  While the SCC model is clearly 
superior to the FCD model at detecting both of these 
classes of attacks, we have also shown that character 
distribution models are much better at detecting 
UNION attacks than Tautology attacks.  This result 
was not entirely unexpected due to the subtle nature of 
Tautology attacks.  We also showed that the SCC 
model is effective at detecting obfuscated attacks. 
The approach operates by parsing the query section 
of HTTP requests and creates profiles for each file. It 
requires no access to the source code, or modification 
of existing software modules. Additionally, we 
illustrated that our proposed approach does not require 
user interaction or the introduction of custom data 
types to reduce false alerts.  
In future work, we aim to further explore the role of 
very specific models in the detection of different types 
of attacks.  The five models from Kruegel and Vigna's 
work (that were not considered in this paper) are in the 
process of such analysis.   
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